CO129-580-2 Sino-Japanese War- British policy and reactions in Hong Kong and Malaya 27-7-1939 - 3-2-1940 — Page 24

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confesses his hopes are not high and he is reluctantly coming to

the conclusion that he will have to throw in his lot with

Russia.

7. He would like to know what measure of importance

democracies attached to China's determination to resist the

Japanese and whether they would like to see China on their

side but she has her own safety to consider and she must look

for help where she can best get it.

8. While I did not encourage him to believe he might get it from us I told him that if he would give me a clear statement

of his difficulties and his needs I would submit them to Your

Lordship. But he said he would be reluctant to go any further.

If on the other hand he were told that we would not be unwilling favourably to consider suggestions from him he would gladly

make them. But he said he would have to ask for an answer

one way or the other by early January when he would have to take important decisions.

9. When I explained that it was unreasonable to expect

matters of such importance to be decided in so short a time he

was much downcast but he would not be persuaded to withdraw this

suggestion.

10. I understand from Donald who is his daily companion and closely in his confidence Chiang Kai-shek [grp. undec.] showed all his hand is due to two reasons: firstly he does not wish to court a rebuff and then he is most anxious not to do

anything that might look like putting a pistol at our head which

is in no way his intention.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 98 Tour series of 10th November; repeated to Shanghai telegram No. 162 Tour series, Tokyo telegram 38, Governor Hongkong telegram No. 22 Tour series, Governor Singapore telegram 4 Tour series, Chungking Tour series, Commander-in-Chief telegram 12 Tour series.